This is the second in my series of posts on the social costs of drug prohibition.you can Read the first post here.
In 1878 Congress passed what is commonly known as 18 United States Code §1385. Posse law, to address the issue of using the military for civil law enforcement purposes.Previous uses of the military, such as suppressing riots during wars Whiskey Rebellion (1791 – 1794) ended in such a disaster that lawmakers began to prohibit the use of military personnel to enforce domestic laws except in established circumstances. The fundamental problem with using the military for such purposes lies in its capabilities. Because soldiers are trained to neutralize or eliminate problems, due process and civil liberties issues are not their primary concern (Marsh, 1991). In enforcing domestic law, civilian police ostensibly must protect civil liberties while enforcing the law.
But in the pursuit of the War on Drugs™, these lines are becoming increasingly blurred. In 1981, the Military Cooperation Law Enforcement Act (MCLE) was passed. to allow the military Work with local law enforcement to do more to stop traffickers. The MCLE allowed the military to expand police access to military bases, research, and equipment, and provide training in the use of military equipment (Cooper, 2015). President Clinton expanded transfers to local departments in 1997 in the form of the 1033 program, giving priority to departments engaged in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism activities. Subsequent legislation, such as the Defense Narcotics Interdiction Assistance Act of 2011, provides for further support from, and cooperation between, the military and local law enforcement in the name of addressing the transmission, sale, and use of prohibited drugs. it was done.
State and local law enforcement not only utilized equipment and intelligence, but also adopted the manners and techniques of combat operations through the formation of elite militias. Special Weapons and Tactical Units (SWAT), Special Response Teams (SRT), and Police Paramilitary Units (PPU) units. These forces were once outliers, with their roots in events such as his late 1960s Watts riots and the Texas Bell Tower shooting (MacDonnell, 2016). The idea behind these units was to act as a last resort in situations that regular forces could not respond to, especially when criminal suspects were likely to be heavily armed. The original SWAT team formed by the Los Angeles Police Department under the leadership of Officer John Nelson and future Police Chief Lt. Daryl Gates captured the public's imagination, but before 1973 it remained largely an anomaly. Ta.
The declaration of war on drugs created a constellation of interests that fueled these paramilitary police forces. It is now a staple of major metropolitan police departments, as well as many smaller police departments as well. At least 90% of departments serving at least 50,000 citizens have established some type of SWAT or PPU unit. This is not all that surprising, since Washington's willingness to divert enforcement resources to suit Washington's mission to combat drugs has resulted in a windfall of free to low-cost equipment, training, and information sharing. What's more, this paradigm is permanent. The less effective interdiction and community cleanup efforts are, the greater the justification for spending more money to redouble these efforts.
Despite the vast resources available to these units, only a small number of officers undergo this training and join the force, with many eventually rotating back to regular duty. Must be careful. Therein lies the problem. Trained to see traffickers, suppliers, and users as enemies to be defeated in the hostile terrain of their own communities, these officers integrate into the regular force and their perspective greatly influences their fellow officers. It has been observed that giving. Williams and Westall (2003) found that despite differences in the likelihood of suspected violence between SWAT and non-SWAT calls, the difference in the use of deadly force between the two groups was negligible. I have found that it is.
In this way, the police Shifted direction from a crime prevention model to one that maximizes arrests. As peacekeeping has been replaced by the pursuit of confrontation, the means of creating this confrontation have expanded from „no-knock“ raids to traffic stops targeting potential drivers carrying large amounts of cash. There is. This confrontational approach naturally increases the potential for violence, but more on this issue later. Some scholars estimate that SWAT units are deployed a conservatively 60,000 times a year, with 62% of those deployments to execute warrants related to drug crimes, often using techniques such as no-knock raids. We estimate that. Paramilitary police units have also been deployed in full riot gear to patrol crime-prone areas, worsening the image of communities under siege.
Next time, I would like to take up the issue of civil asset confiscation.
Turnell Brown is an economist and public policy analyst based in Atlanta.