In the world of politics, as in baseball, it can sometimes be difficult for a promising player from the minor leagues to match up to a pitcher in the major leagues.
Shortly after Sarah Palin was chosen as the Republican vice presidential nominee in 2008, my friend Ubus, who grew up in Alaska and is a keen political observer, wrote: next:
Palin would probably make a pretty good president. . . . she is very popular. Her approval rating reached the 90% range. Even now, with a small crony scandal going on, she's still at about 80%. . . . How do we do that? You might get 60% or 70% of her enthusiastic love and support, but you'll also get a solid core of opponents who hate you with just as much passion. To get to 90%, you need to be boringly competent without being offensive to people of all political stripes.
After discussing Alaska's unique politics at length, Ubus writes:
Palin's magic formula for success was simply to ignore the partisan nonsense and get on with the boring job of fixing a broken government. . . . It's not a very exciting answer, but I think that's why she has such a high approval rating. Because Democrats, liberals, and centrists all appreciate the good work she does on boring non-partisan things that everyone agrees on. It's not like you're offending them by doing something about partisan things that they don't agree with.
Hey, you probably never expected to see the words „boringly competent,“ „rude,“ and „Sarah Palin“ in the same sentence.
Prediction and extrapolation
So what's the big deal? Palin had a reputation as an effective nonpartisan governor, but he turned bipartisan when he took to the big stage. This contrast is interesting to me because it suggests a failure of extrapolation.
Now, let's move on to baseball. One of the great discoveries of baseball statistics guru Bill James was that minor league statistics, if adjusted correctly, can predict major league performance. James says he's working on a three-step process: (1) naive trust in minor league statistics, (2) recognition that raw minor league statistics are misleading, and (3) changing statistics. adjustment process. There's a lot of information out there if you know how to use it.
As a political analogy, consider Scott Brown. Last year, when he was running for the House of Lords, political scientist Boris Schor analyzed his political ideology. The question was how he would vote in the Senate if he was elected.boris I have written:
There is evidence from multiple sources. In an editorial supporting Mr. Coakley, the Boston Globe called Mr. Brown „the national Republican way.“ Liberal bloggers have tried to link him to the Tea Party movement and claim he is deeply conservative. Chuck Schumer called him „far right.“
In 2002, he responded to a Votesmart survey about his policy positions while running for state senate. Reading through his answers doesn't reveal much other than that he's a pro-choice, anti-tax, pro-gun Republican. His interest group reputation spans the world. . . .
All in all, a very confusing assessment and very inaccurate. So how do we compare Brown to other state legislators, or more generally, to other politicians across the country?
My (Boris) research and that of Nolan McCarty at Princeton University allow us to make these comparisons accurately. Essentially, I'm using the entire voting records of statehouses across the country and adjusting them through Project Votesmart's candidate surveys so they can be compared.
By doing so, we can estimate Brown's ideology score very accurately. It turns out that his score is -0.17 compared to her score of 0.02. Liberals score low. Conservatives are higher. Mr. Brown's scores place him in the 34th percentile among the party in Massachusetts from 1995 to 2006. In other words, two-thirds of Massachusetts' other Republican state legislators were more conservative than he was. This is evidence of my (Boris') claim that he is a liberal even within his own party. What's notable about this is the fact that Massachusetts Republicans are the most, or almost the most liberal, Republicans in the nation.
Very Jamesian, don't you think? And Boris's views are supported by Scott Brown's voting record, certainly the most liberal of the Senate Republicans.
political presumption
Now, let's get back to Sarah Palin. First, her popularity. Governor Palin was certainly popular, but Alaska is a small state (in terms of population). questionnaire
It turns out that most of the popular governors in the United States live in small states. Here are the data for 2006 and his 2008:
There are several theories about this pattern. The important point here is that some Bill James-style statistical adjustments may be needed before state-level statistics can be brought up to the national level.
Difference between baseball and politics
However, something else is happening. It's not just that Palin isn't as popular as she first appeared. There are also qualitative changes. From „boring, competent independent“ he went on to. . . Well, competency issues aside, she's no longer boring or nonpartisan! In baseball terms, it's like Ozzie Smith coming out of the minors and becoming a Dave Kingman-style slugger. (Please excuse the example that shows how long it has been since I followed baseball!)
So how is baseball different from politics as it relates to statistical prediction?
1. There is only one goal in baseball: to win. Score more points than other teams. Yes, individual players have other goals: staying healthy, getting paid, not being traded to Montreal, etc. But overall, the various goals align, and if you play well, you can achieve all of them to some extent.
But there is two Central goals in politics: winning and policy. You want to win elections, but in order to win, it's important to enact policies you like. (True, there are political hacks who sell out to the highest bidder, but even these political figures represent some interest groups with goals beyond simply being in power.)
So in baseball, you want to predict how a player can help his team win, but in politics, you want to predict two things: electoral success and policy positions.
2. Baseball is all about ability. Natural athleticism, intelligence (as Bill James said, that and speed are the only skills used in both offense and defense), and good old-fashioned work ethic, focus, and concentration. The role of competence in politics is less clear. In his remarks that sparked this discussion, Ubbs suggested that Palin has the ability and inclination to solve real problems. However, it is not clear how to measure such abilities in a way that allows generalization to other political contexts.
3. Baseball is the same environment at every level. The basepaths are the same length in the major leagues as they are in AA ball (at least I think that's true!), the only difference is that they are thrown harder in the majors. Sure, the strike zone and field dimensions may be different, but it's pretty much the same game.
However, in the case of politics, I don't know. Some aspects of politics actually generalize. The Massachusetts Senate is supposed to be very different from the US Senate, but research by Boris Scholl and Nolan McCarty shows that there is considerable consistency in how people vote in these different environments. However, I think the situation is very different for executives. The main task of the executive is not only to register positions on issues, but also to negotiate.
4. In baseball, it's either in or out. If you're not playing (or coaching), you're not really part of the story. Sportswriters can scream all they want, but no one cares. In contrast, the world of politics is full of activists, candidates, and potential candidates. In this sense, the apt analogy is not that Sarah Palin started out as Ozzie Smith and then became Dave Kingman, but rather that in a world where media personalities can be just as powerful, Ozzie Smith It was a transition from Smith to radio call-in host. , and are as well-paid as the players on the field. Perhaps this would have been a good move in this alternate world for, say, Bill Lee, a well-spoken player who can't quite keep the ball over the plate but has a talent for debate?
Commenter Paul made a good point. here:
How many bats do you have during your term as governor? Probably the most detailed story I can imagine is he's a quarter. At the period level, it is better to make each „at-bat“ independent of the previous one. There isn't much predictive value after about 20 at-bats. Even with over 500 at-bats for the season, fans are still trying to figure out whether his big jump in BABIP is a sign of better bat control or just good luck.
The same problem occurs when there are very few at-bats. If you stand at bat in front of the slugger, you can sit on a pitch in the zone. If you have a weakness in a particular pitching style, you may not be able to find it. And once the ball is in the air, whether it reaches the fielder or not is largely a matter of luck.
If we can somehow get political candidates to fill 300 to 400 different political offices in different states with different party goals and endorsements, we have a lot of potential for future jobs, including hopping from state to country. I think it will allow us to predict performance better. level. But the governor's day-to-day success is highly correlated.
Indeed, when it comes to policy positions, politicians have many opportunities to „stand on the floor,“ or vote in Congress. But when it comes to elections, politicians have at most a few dozen over their entire career.
all of the above This is a post from 2011. Then I thought about it. This recent exchange Ron DeSantis talks with Mark Palko about his political candidacy.
In addition to all of the above, let me add one more difference between baseball and politics. In baseball, the situation is basically fixed, and the only thing that matters is the ability of the players. In politics, by contrast, context matters most. In American general elections, candidates don't really matter. (The primary election is another story.) In summary, we have a lot of data to estimate large signals to differentiate baseball players by ability. There is little data to estimate small signals when it comes to distinguishing politicians by their ability to win votes.